This paper studies a general equilibrium model that is consistent with recent empirical evidence showing that the U.S. price level and in ‡ation are much more responsive to aggregate technology shocks than to monetary policy shocks.
Introduction
Empirical work on nominal price adjustment has shown that the U.S. aggregate price level and in ‡ation are much more responsive to aggregate technology shocks, such as innovation in total factor productivity, than to monetary policy shocks, such as unexpected innovations in the Federal Funds rate. 1 Moreover, the di¤erence between in ‡ation adjustment speed to the two shocks is more evident in the sub-sample coinciding with Volcker and Greenspan at the helm of the Federal Reserve. 2 Standard models of sticky prices have a hard time explaining the di¤erent behavior of the price level and in ‡ation in response to these two aggregate shocks. 3 Indeed, one of the central issues in modern macroeconomics is understanding how …rms set their prices in response to di¤erent aggregate shocks. This is an important task for monetary policy analysis and implementation. Understanding the transmission of technology and monetary policy shocks is particularly relevant as these shocks account together for a large fraction of business cycle ‡uctuations. 4 We study a model that is consistent with the empirical evidence that prices respond much more quickly to aggregate technology shocks than to monetary policy shocks. We show that this response pattern arises naturally in a framework based on imperfect information with an endogenous choice of information structure similar to Sims (2003) . In this model, …rms will optimally choose to allocate more attention to those particular shocks that, in expectations, most reduce pro…ts when prices are not adjusted properly. The more attention …rms pay to a type of shock, the faster they respond to it. This is a result that has been emphasized in the seminal paper by Maćkowiak 1 Wiederholt (2009) , where these authors have shown that …rms pay more attention to sector speci…c shocks than to aggregate nominal shocks roughly because the former are much more volatile than the latter. So, at …rst sight, this result would directly translate to a framework with aggregate technology and monetary policy shocks:
since in the U.S. aggregate technology shocks are more volatile than monetary policy shocks, everything else being equal, …rms allocate more attention to the former than to latter, inducing faster price responses to technology shocks. 5 However, most important, we show that this is not the whole story. In a standard general equilibrium model, for given shock volatilities, the coe¢ cients of the monetary policy rule may amplify or reduce di¤erences in attention allocation across di¤erent types of shocks. This paper adds to the literature on two dimensions. First, the paper provides an analytical characterization of the solution to the general equilibrium model. This analytical solution allows to capture fully the interaction between monetary policy, real rigidities and complementarity in attention allocation. Second, most important, the paper shows that allowing for a feedback rule in monetary policy improves substantially the ability of the rational inattention model to match the relatively fast response of in ‡ation to aggregate productivity shocks, and the relatively slow response to monetary policy shocks. In particular, we show that, when the systematic component of monetary policy responds more to in ‡ation ‡uctuations, complementarity in attention allocation increases. This higher complementarity induce …rms to pay more attention to the same variables that other …rms pay more attention to, amplifying the di¤erence in price responsiveness to technology and monetary policy shocks. We show that a high degree of monetary policy feedback to in ‡ation helps to reconcile the rational inattention model with the empirical evidence about 5 Figure 1 plots the growth rate in total factor productivity and the change in the Federal Funds rate from 1960 to 2007. Other authors have estimated the volatility of technology and monetary policy shocks within DSGE models. See, for instance, Smets and Wouters (2007 Moreover, this novel mechanism of transmission introduces an asymmetry in the way changes in the systematic response of monetary policy to in ‡ation in ‡uence price responsiveness to di¤erent shocks. When, for instance, policy responds more against in ‡ation, the new equilibrium is characterized by a larger fraction of attention paid to the most volatile shocks, and a smaller fraction paid to the least volatile ones. As a consequence of the change in policy, everything else being equal, this channel of transmission causes price variability to reduce relatively less conditional on the most volatile shocks, and more conditional on the least volatile ones.
The results of this paper are obtained within a standard general equilibrium framework with a representative household, monopolistically competitive …rms and a central bank that controls money supply so that the equilibrium dynamics of the nominal interest resemble the ones of a Taylor-type policy rule. In this model, prices respond more to the realizations of shocks about which …rms are better informed. Technology shocks are aggregate innovations to labor productivity, while monetary policy shocks are shocks to money supply. The only friction introduced in this framework is that …rms might not be well informed about the realizations of the shocks when changing their prices. The information structure of the economy is modeled along the lines of Maćkowiak and Wiederholt (2009). There is a limit on the total attention each …rm can pay to the di¤erent shocks. This limit introduces a trade-o¤ in the allocation of attention.
This paper relates to the large literature studying price setting decisions under incomplete information. Incomplete information theories have been popular in accounting for the sluggish price adjustment in response to monetary policy shocks.
Behind these theories there is the assumption that …rms only pay attention to a relatively small number of economic indicators. With imprecise information about 3 aggregate conditions, prices respond with delay to changes in nominal spending. This simple idea was …rst proposed by Phelps (1970) and formalized by Lucas (1972) Most of the analysis will focus on a model with iid productivity and monetary policy shocks, allowing for an analytical characterization of the equilibrium. In Section 4 we will consider the case of persistent shocks.
Household:
The representative household's preferences over sequences of the …nal good consumption C t and labor supply L t are given by
where 2 (0; 1) is the discount factor, and > 0 is the inverse of the Frisch elasticity.
The …nal consumption good is obtained through a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator over the di¤erent varieties c i;t ;
where > 1 determines the elasticity of substitution across varieties. The household's objective is to maximize (1) with respect to fC t ; L t ; c i;t ; B t+1 ; M t+1 g 1 =0 subject to its 5 sequence of ‡ow budget constraints, for = 0; 1; :::
where P t is the price of the …nal consumption good, W t the nominal wage rate, and D t the aggregate pro…ts of the corporate sector rebated to the household. The representative household can transform pre-consumption wealth in period t into money balances, M t , and bond holdings, B t , paying an interest rate R t in period t + 1: The purpose of holding money is to purchase goods. We assume that the representative household faces the following cash-in-advance constraint
The representative household also faces a no-Ponzi-scheme condition. We assume for simplicity that R t > 1 for all t, so that (4) is always binding.
We introduce the cash-in-advance constraint because it allows to obtain a mapping from the monetary policy instrument, i.e. the control of money supply, to the monetary policy target, i.e. the nominal interest rare. The advantage of explicitly deriving this mapping is that of avoiding multiplicity of equilibria. In Section 5 we show that our results can be extended to a cashless economy à la Woodford (2003) .
The formulation of the cash-in-advance constraint given above implies that there are no monetary transaction frictions because wage income can be transformed immediately into cash and cash can be spent immediately on goods. This speci…cation of the cash-in-advance constraint is equivalent to the speci…cation in Atkeson, Chari and Kehoe (2010). 6 We decided to adopt this formulation in the benchmark economy for two reasons. First, this formulation of the cash-in-advance constraint allows for a more e¢ cient and transparent solution of the model. 7 Second, this speci…cation of our economy is observationally equivalent to the one adopted by Melosi (2011) , so that we can use his empirical estimates to evaluate the predictions of our model.
The optimal demand of variety i is given by
where p i;t is the price of variety i: The …rst order conditions for labor supply, money and nominal bond demands imply
Monetary Policy: The monetary authority controls money supply M t ; according to the following rule
where X t Ct C t is the ratio of aggregate consumption to e¢ cient consumption C t :
8
The variable Q t is an exogenous disturbance to money supply and is given by
and the government subsidizes labor with a subsidy rate equal to the risk-free nominal interest rate. 7 This assumption avoids forward-looking variables in the problem of …rms, so that the Kalman …lter can be used to solve the signal extraction problem as shown by Woodford (2002) . 8 In this model output coincides with consumption. E¢ cient consumption corressponds to the level of consumption in the model with ‡exible prices and perfect information, C t = 1+ A t : 7 where " q;t is an iid and normally distributed monetary policy disturbance, " q;t v N 0; 2 q ; and q 2 [0; 1]: The money supply rule in (9)- (10) is the sum of a systematic component, p ln P t + x ln X t ; that adjusts money supply in response to ‡uctuations in in ‡ation and output-gap, and an exogenous stochastic process, ln Q t ; capturing exogenous dynamics in money supply: The money supply rule in (9)- (10) is appealing for two reasons. First, the intertemporal Euler condition in (7) and the rule for money supply in (9)- (10) imply that the path for the nominal interest rate is, to a …rst order approximation, given by
where R is the nominal interest rate in the non-stochastic steady state, t+1
The expression for the nominal interest rate in (11) is appealing as it resembles policies of the type suggested by Taylor rules, where the nominal interest rate responds to expected in ‡ation and output ‡uctuations. 9 Second, if p = x = 0; i.e. there is no feedback, the money rule in (9)- (10) is comparable to the rules studied by Woodford In Section 5, we will solve the model in the case of a cashless economy where monetary policy is speci…ed directly in terms of the nominal interest rate.
Firms: Each variety i is produced by a single monopolistic …rm using labor as the only input into production, according to
where A t is an aggregate exogenous process evolving according to
where " a;t are normally distributed technology innovations to aggregate labor productivity, " a;t v N (0; 
Given (5) ; (12) and (14) ; pro…t-maximization implies
where p i;t denotes the desired price, and
is the degree of real rigidity.
Information structure: We now specify the assumptions about the information structure. he information set of the price setter in …rm i in period t is i;t = i; 1 [ fs i;0 ; s i;1 ; : : : ; s i;t g ;
where i; 1 is the initial information set of the price setter in …rm i and s i;t is the signal that he or she receives in period t. The latter is a two-dimensional vector consisting of a noisy signal concerning aggregate technology and a noisy signal concerning money supply:
We assume that the noise in the signal is due to limited attention by the decisionmaker. 11 The noise in the signal has the following properties: (i) the processes Firms decide how to allocate their attention in period zero, before making the price setting decisions, by maximizing the discounted sum of pro…ts from future activity,
12 In order to have an analytical solution to the attention allocation problem, this paper considers a second order Taylor expansion of the discounted sum of future pro…ts around the non-stochastic steady state, in deviation from the discounted value of pro…ts under the full-information pro…t-maximizing behavior.
The attention allocation problem of …rm i reads
subject the optimal price setting behavior conditional on the information available at each period;
log (p i;t ) = E log p i;t j i;t ;
and to to the information ‡ow constraint
where i;t = i;t 1 [ fs ai;t ; s qi;t g is the information set available to i, Qjt 1 denote the conditional variance of Q t given information of the price setter of …rm i in period t and t 1 respectively.
The constraint (20) measures the mutual information between the signal process fs it g and the structural shocks fA t ; Q t g.
14 The more information about the structural shocks into signals, the larger the measure of mutual information. The parameter indexes …rm's total attention, measuring the per-period information ‡ow about the two shocks. In practice, if is …nite, the information ‡ow constraint prevents decision 13 The parameter is given by
where L is the level of consumption in the non-stochastic steady state. See Maćkowiak and Wiederholt (2009) for a derivation. and a discussion of the reliability of the approximation.
14 Formally, the mutual information is given by
where h(A t ; Q t j i;t 1 ) denotes the conditional entropy of A t and Q t given i;t 1 and h (A t ; Q t j i;t ) denotes the conditional entropy of A t and Q t given i;t . Given that fA t ; s ai;t g and fQ t ; s qi;t g are independent and normally distributed the mutual information can be written as in (20) .
makers from choosing p i;t = p i;t in each period and state of the world. The units of measure of relates to the capacity of a channel of transmitting information, and are given by bits. For instance, one bit is the channel capacity needed to communicate the realization of a fair coin ‡ip. 15 The signal structure (17), together with constraint (20) ; implies a trade-o¤ in the attention allocation across the two types of shocks: if a …rm pays more attention to one type of shock (i.e. chooses the corresponding signal process to be relatively more informative), it necessarily has to pay less attention to the other type of shock.
The equilibrium
The model is solved through a log-linearization of the …rst order conditions characterizing the equilibrium of the economy in a neighborhood of the non-stochastic steady state. The economy as two aggregate states, A t and Q t : Solving for the equilibrium of this economy requires solving for a …xed point. In fact, the attention allocation problem in (18) (19) depends on the stochastic process for the pro…t-maximizing price,p i;t ; which in turn depends on the stochastic process for the price level,P t :
The latter is an average over all intermediate good prices and therefore depends itself on the solution to the attention allocation problem of …rms. In what followŝ X t log X t log X denotes the value of X t in log-deviations from the non-stochastic steady state. 
(vi) all other markets clear.
The case of i.i.d. aggregate shocks
In this section we obtain an analytical solution to the model in a special case where A t and Q t are iid over time, i.e. ln Q t = q + " q;t and ln A t = a + " a;t :
There exists a stationary equilibrium in which the equilibrium dynamics of economic variables in period t are given by a set of linear functions of " a;t and " q;t : In this equilibrium, the price level and consumption are given bŷ
where a and q are coe¢ cients given by
while , , and the function ( ) are given by
Proof. See Appendix A.
The equilibrium responses of prices to the two shocks depend on relative volatility,
; on the degree of real rigidity, ; on the average quantity of information processed per period, ; and on : The parameter has an important economic meaning, as it indexes relative monetary policy aggressiveness on expected in ‡ation and output-gap.
The function ( ) determines the equilibrium price level responsiveness to a given shock as a function of relative volatility of that shock. The function ( ) is increasing in its argument for values of 2 (1= ; ): The latter follows from noticing that the denominator of (25) is strictly positive at an interior solution of the attention allocation problem: 16 Therefore, the equilibrium price level is more responsive to relatively more volatile shocks.
Moreover, the slope of ( ) with respect to its argument depends on and :
the smaller or ; the larger the impact of a change in relative volatility, ; on price level responsiveness to the two shocks. The next proposition describes the relationship between equilibrium price responsiveness and structural parameters. Proof. The results follow immediately from the de…nition of ( ) and in (23)
The higher the volatility of technology shocks relatively to monetary policy shocks, the higher price responsiveness to technology shocks relative to policy shocks. The lower or ; the higher the di¤erence in price responsiveness to the two shocks.
When is low enough, the model implies a corner solution where prices only respond to the most volatile shock. Finally notice that the level of the volatility of the two shocks does not matter for the allocation of attention, as long as their ratio is constant. 17 
Equilibrium attention allocation and monetary policy rule
Solving the attention allocation problem implies choosing the precision of signals (17) so to maximize (18) subject to (20) (19) : This problem depends on the equilibrium dynamics of the desired price. These dynamics are obtained by substituting (22) into
where the equilibrium dynamics ofP t are given by (21) (26). The coe¢ cient can be interpreted as the degree of strategic complementarity in price setting: the smaller ; the larger the feedback from the price level to desired prices.
In equilibrium, the optimal attention allocation is such that signal precision to each type of shock is given by
where ! represents desired price responsiveness to technology shocks relative to monetary policy shocks,
…rms allocate relatively more attention to technology shocks than to monetary policy shocks either because technology shocks are more volatile, i.e. > 1; or because they have a larger impact on the desired price than monetary policy shocks, i.e.
! > 1. 18 However, while shock volatilities are exogenous to the model, desired price responsiveness is not. In particular, by substituting (23) into (29) it is possible to derive ! as a function only of the structural parameters of the model,
It follows from (28) and (30) that shock volatilities a¤ect the attention allocation 18 More details on the solution to the attention problem are available in Appendix A.
through two channels. First, as discussed above, for given desired price responsiveness to shocks, more attention is paid to more volatile shocks. Second, shock volatilities in ‡uence the attention allocation problem through relative desired responsiveness, !: since more volatile shocks receive relatively more attention by all …rms, they also have a higher associated price level responsiveness; the feedback e¤ect from price level responsiveness to the desired price responsiveness a¤ects the attention allocation decision.
Whether this feedback reinforces or reduces the impact of di¤erences in volatili-
ties of shocks on the attention allocation decision depends on the value of : It is at this stage that parameters of the interest rate feedback rule a¤ect the attention allocation decision. If < 1; …rm i pays more attention a type of shock whenever its competitors are more responsive to that type of shock, i.e. there are positive complementarity in attention allocation. In this case, the feedback e¤ect reinforces the impact of di¤erent volatilities on attention allocation; in contrast, if > 1 the opposite is true and there are negative complementarity in attention allocation and the feedback e¤ect reduces the impact of di¤erent volatilities.
Intuitively, an increase in p ; and therefore a lower ; reduces the ‡uctuations in output-gap to all shocks. For given price level responsiveness, the smaller responsiveness of the output-gap to shocks induces the price level to be relatively more important for desired price dynamics. Hence, complementarities are higher.
While studying optimal policy is beyond the scope of this paper, the paper yields novel predictions on the impact of a change in the coe¢ cients of the policy rule on the economy when compared to more standard models of sticky prices. When monetary authority changes the coe¢ cients of the Taylor rule, it a¤ects the economy through two channels. The …rst channel is a standard one, taking place also in models of nominal rigidities: for given information structure, a nominal interest rate respond-ing more (less) to expected in ‡ation accommodates technology shocks and o¤sets monetary policy shocks more (less); this reduces (increases) output-gap ‡uctuations, causing a smaller (larger) variability of prices to both types of shocks. The second channel is novel: by a¤ecting the degree of complementarity in attention allocation, a more (less) active policy induces …rms to pay more (less) attention to the most volatile shocks and less (more) to the least volatile ones.
The case of persistent innovations
In this section we solve for the impulse responses of in ‡ation and output to permanent innovations in money supply and productivity, as of (10) and (13) (9). We solve the model in two steps. In the …rst step, for given guess of and ; we solve for the equilibrium dynamics of the economy as just described. In the second step, we solve for the optimal attention allocation, i.e. for the optimal and ; given the equilibrium dynamics derived in step 1. Then We update the guess for and
; and go to step 1 until convergence.
The time unit is the quarter. We drew on the business cycle literature for the values of the preference parameter, , of output elasticity to labor, ; and discount factor, : These parameters are the same used by Melosi (2011) in his estimation of the model. In particular, similar to Woodford (2003) , the demand elasticity parameter is set equal to = 11, while the parameter is set equal to 2/3, to match the average labor share of output in the U.S. The parameter is set to = 1; so to imply the Table 1 : k a is allocation of attention to productivity shock; k q is allocation of attention to monetary policy shock.
shock, is measured as
where^ i s is the response of the in ‡ation rate to shock i 2 fa; qg ; evaluated s quarters after the shock. According to this measure, in ‡ation is weakly persistent when the e¤ects of shocks decay quickly, and it is strongly persistent when they decay slowly.
When the e¤ects of shock i die quickly, r i is close to zero for shorter horizons. But when the e¤ects of shock i decay slowly, r i remains far from zero for longer horizon.
According to Paciello (2011) , in ‡ation response to a productivity shock accomplishes 64% of its adjustment within the …rst year, i.e. r a = 0:34; while it accomplishes only 37% of its adjustment to a monetary policy shock within the …rst year, i.e. r q = 0:63:
Therefore, for each value of ; we choose and to match r a = 0:34 and r q = 0:63: Table 1 reports the values of and associated to each value of obtained from the procedure just described, as well as the implied allocation of attention between productivity and monetary policy shocks. Figure 2 plots in ‡ation responses to a productivity and to a monetary policy shock predicted by the model in the case of = 0:01: Two main results emerge from this exercise.
First, at = 1; i.e. in absence of monetary policy feedback, the model needs the volatility of the productivity shock to be 80% larger than the volatility of the monetary policy innovation to match the empirical functions. This result is at odd with empirical evidence from U.S. data. For instance, the volatility of the growth rate in TFP estimated by Fernald (2007) is only about 30% larger than the volatility in the growth rate of nominal GDP. This is a result emphasized by Melosi (2011) who estimates the same model with = 1 and argues that, given the relatively low empirical estimate of ; the rational inattention model cannot generate enough asymmetry in the allocation of attention between the aggregate productivity and monetary policy shock to match the empirical functions. However, Table 1 shows that as the feedback in the monetary policy rule increases, i.e. goes towards zero, the ratio of volatilities between the two aggregate shocks, ; needed to account for the empirical impulse responses decreases. In fact, at = 0:01; we need the volatility of the aggregate productivity shock to be just 20% larger than the volatility of the monetary policy shock, i.e. 22 productivity shocks. 22 In this sense, we should interpret the value of = 0:01 as a lower bound on the extent of feedback in monetary policy needed to match in ‡ation responses.
Extension: a nominal interest rate rule
In this section we assume that monetary policy is not speci…ed in terms of a money supply rule, but rather an interest rate rule. In particular, equations (9)- (11) are replaced by the following equation
where " r;t v N (0; Table 2 : k a is allocation of attention to productivity shock; k q is allocation of attention to monetary policy shock.
process are set equal to estimates obtained from …tting (13) to the detrended logarithm of U.S. total factor productivity estimated by Fernald (2007) over the two subsamples. 25 These parameters are displayed in Table 2 : policy coe¢ cients on in ‡ation and output-gap more than double in the Volcker-Greenspan period, while shock volatilities reduce approximately by a half, although the ratio is approximately equal to two in both periods. We set = 3:5 so that the cost of processing information is similar In contrast, the model predicts that in ‡ation responds relatively more 25 Fernald (2007) estimates TFP in the U.S. with a Solow residual approach, adjusting for labor hoarding and capital utilization. 26 We measure the cost of processing information in my model as the product of and the Lagrangian multiplier associated to the constraint on information ‡ow. The latter can be interpreted as the shadow price of : 27 The latter has induced an increase in complementarity in allocation of attention across …rms, amplifying the incentives to allocate relatively more attention to technology shocks, for given volatilities of shocks. case of the previous section, the version of the model with the nominal interest rate rule cannot generate enough persistence in in ‡ation response to both types of shocks.
In fact, the basic framework of this paper allows for a closed form solution, but is too simple to fully account for business cycle dynamics. For instance, the model does not allow for physical capital accumulation, or for habit persistence in consumption, which typically increase in ‡ation persistence in response to aggregate shocks. Extending the basic framework to incorporate these features is an important step to evaluate the ability of these models to account for business cycle dynamics. Maćkowiak and Wiederholt (2010) is an important contribution in this direction.
Concluding remarks
This paper has analytically derived the channel through which the feedback component of a monetary policy rule a¤ect the attention allocation decision by …rms.
According to this channel, a monetary policy rule responding relatively more aggressively to in ‡ation increases relative di¤erences in price responsiveness to technology and monetary policy shocks by inducing …rms to allocate more attention to the most volatile shock. This paper shows that a simple model of price setting under rational inattention and attention allocation naturally generates in ‡ation to adjust faster to aggregate technology shocks than to monetary policy shocks. Similarly to more standard Calvostyle models of price rigidities, inertia in in ‡ation response arises from frictions in price setting. The less informed …rms are on aggregate shocks, the larger inertia in in ‡ation responses. However, di¤erently from the Calvo model of price rigidity where …rms adjust prices to all shocks at the same time, with endogenous attention decision the extent of the imperfect information friction may vary conditional on di¤erent types of 26 aggregate shocks. In the model of this paper, …rms have incentives to allocate more attention to technology shocks than to monetary policy shocks because the former are more volatile than the latter. However, most importantly, this paper shows that a combination of relatively high real rigidity and aggressive monetary policy is needed to magnify the impact of di¤erent volatilities on relative price responsiveness. In particular, a monetary policy rule responding to in ‡ation and output ampli…es the e¤ects of exogenous shock volatility di¤erential on the attention allocation decision and, therefore, on price responsiveness di¤erential to the two shocks. The the …rst-order conditions to this problem imply where the second equality follows from using (36) and function ( ) is given by
At the corner solution the shock j = a; q that receives all the attention as an associated j = 1 2 2 1 (1 ) (1 2 2 ) ; while j = 0:
(Step 4): Derivation of
An interior solution to the attention allocation problem requires that 0 < In ‡ation and output impulse responses to one standard deviation technology and monetary policy shocks, under the di¤erent parameterizations of the model described in Table 2 . Responses are intended in % deviations from steady state.
